Against the sacrifice of human freedom to the market. An anthropo-philosophical reflection

Abstract

Freedom is subject to the market. This subjection is proportional to the totalization of the market. The above is the problem discussed in this article, questioning the position of economic liberalism, in which the freedom of the market implies human freedom. Our analysis warns that such an argument in defense of freedom is problematic. For this reason we start from the following hypothesis: the freedom of the market does not imply human freedom, because, first of all, human beings cannot submit to a creation of their own. To consider its possibility is a refutable anthropological position. Secondly, to affirm that the freedom of the market implies human freedom would have as its basis an allegedly aprioristic nature, that of considering it as a being for work. In such a way that the consequence of this justification is the inversion of freedom. This inversion is a subversion of human relations with its institutions. Our conclusion
leads to the idea that the humanization of human creations leads to the dehumanization of humanity.